

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

NSC review completed

OIS 85-137

25 March 1985

Mr. Henry Bardach
Director, Office of Systematic Review
Classification/Declassification Center
Bureau of Administration
Department of State
Room 1239, New State Building
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

We have completed our review of the manuscript for FRUS, 1958-60, Volume XIII, Malaysia/Singapore and Philippines; and FRUS, 1952-54, Volume XII, Part II, Philippines.

The enclosed ANNEX A details the deletions that CIA requires in order to declassify Volume XIII. ANNEX B performs the same function for Volume XII, Part II. The passages or pages to be deleted are bracketed in red pencil in the manuscript as well as identified in the annexes.

This letter provides CIA clearance for these two volumes, contingent on your assurance that there is no further material intended for publication in them that is of interest to CIA and not yet reviewed by us.

Sincerely,



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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:

1. Manuscript of FRUS, 1958-60, Volume XIII, Malaysia/Singapore, Philippines
2. Manuscript of FRUS, 1952-54, Volume XII, Part II, Philippines
3. ANNEX A
4. ANNEX B

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FROM ENCLOSURES

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SPA files, Lot 63 D 18, "Consulate General-Singapore" *Letter from*

The Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the

Consul General in Singapore

Secret Official-Information ☐ Releasable ☐ Releasable if ☐ Excise as shown ☐ Deny ☐ Downgrade to ☐ Review Again ☐ Reviewer ☐ Basis-1-3005 ☐ Date 2/24/58

Dear Pete:

We are much alarmed by the rather serious leftist gains in Singapore and have been trying to figure out just what the British intend to do about this deterioration. Your 929 was especially interesting in this connection but we would like to have a reading on British plans in greater detail.

Our impressions at this time, based entirely on your reports, lead us to believe that the British 1) are going ahead with internal self-government for Singapore; 2) prefer that local political power remain with Lim and the LF and probably will continue to give him moral, political and limited financial support; 3) are not, however, putting all their chips on Lim and are willing to work with Lee despite his extreme Left-wing supporters; 4) figure that if worse comes/worst, they will step back into the picture with their reserve powers.

It strikes us that if this analysis is substantially accurate, the situation in Singapore could become very sticky. We are especially worried over the prospects of Lee coming to power because we have great doubts that he could control the Left-wingers on whom his strength depends. If this is the case, then presumably the British would step in and try to re-establish direct control. We doubt if this could be done without a very bloody mess and a great psychological defeat for the Free World.

On the other hand, we see no logical way out of the dilemma except through Lim and a more effective LF. Here, however, it would appear that the LF leaders are still thinking in terms of gimmicks and dramatics rather than dull arduous party organization and performance.

In telegram 929 from Singapore, Jan. 28, 1958, Peterson described the dominant attitude at the United Kingdom Chiefs of Mission conference (held in Singapore on Jan. 18) was a conviction that Singapore was crucial to Britain's position in the Far East and that the British would have no choice but to take direct action to prevent a Communist takeover should such an outcome seem imminent. (746F.OO/1-2858)

The account of British policy presented in this paragraph corresponds exactly with the conclusions reported in telegram 4173 from London on Jan. 16, 1958 and reviewed in despatch 2502 from London Jan. 21, 1958. (746F.OO/1-1658 and (746F.OO/1-2158)

Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock.

Lee Kuan Yew, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the People's Action Party.

61

~~3-3769, JANUARY 21, 4 PM, FROM LONDON~~

CERTAIN AMOUNT OF "RIDING WITH WIND" OF ANTI-COLONIALISM AND EXCESSIVE NATIONALISM AND OF PATIENCE HAS PROVEN NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OUR ELIGIBILITY TO WORK WITH WHAT EVEN NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL ELEMENTS ARE IN POWER WHEN THEIR NEED ARISES FOR OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE, AS IT ALMOST ALWAYS DOES.

SEE ALSO EMBASSY DESPATCH 1630 JANUARY 19 FOR FURTHER DETAILS COL OFFICE THINKING SINGAPORE. 6

4. ALSO SUGGEST THAT EMPHASIS IN CONSULTATIONS BE ON VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS WHICH CAN OCCUR SINGAPORE AND ON ASSETS WHICH WE CAN MOBILIZE TO FAVORABLY INFLUENCE THEM, RATHER THAN MERELY ON EXCHANGE OF ESTIMATES.

BARBOUR

~~SAM/20~~

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 Despatch 1630 from London on Jan. 19, 1959 summarized "several discussions" with John D. Hennings, Officer in Charge of the Singapore Desk in the Colonial Office. In terms of the Singapore political situation, Hennings was quoted as thinking that Lim Yew Hock's party "might have a fighting chance" but that in any event, while Lee Kuan Yew was he was also an "anti-Communist." Hennings clearly stated that "... we intend, if necessary, to revoke the constitution and feel reasonably sure that it can be done with no great difficulty." On the other hand, Hennings believed that the Singapore situation had improved and that the Colonial Office did not anticipate a severe crisis in the foreseeable future. (746F.03/1-1959)

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aspiring politicians and white collar jobs and denial to
Mayor Ong of a position on sidelines while Lee tackled seem-
ingly insoluble problems of Singapore.

CONGEN's assessment is that if going gets rough, either as
result of demands upon Lee from leftists in his party or
problems facing first Singapore Government Lee might abandon
political leadership and resume law practice, perhaps in
England, or acquiesce to leftists.

Governor says confidence of Colonial Office in Lee reflects
partly his appraisal but is also based on Lennex-Boyd's ex-
tensive negotiations with Lee on constitutional questions during
which favorable opinion formed.

Re point 3, Governor has evidence that leftist trade unions
planning field several independent candidates and he can
envisage situation where UK might support relatively moderate
PAP candidate against such independent leftist or Citizens
Party candidate where SPA entry had no chance.

Despatch follows.

Governor thinks US more sanguine as to what can be done to
determine outcome of election, he admitting his caution against
providing anything more than moderate support (though he admits
our moral obligation not to let Lim speak) whereas he senses
US believes massive backing should be provided. He thinks this
dangerous and unproductive.

Despatch follows.

Ong Eng Guan.

PETERSON

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United States objectives is not good and it is believed that United States
and free world interests have received a distinct setback as a result of
the victory of the leftist People's Action Party. . . ."

covering letter by Melbourne recorded an OCB recommendation for an
"urgent" policy review of sections on Singapore to provide guidance for
the new situation created by the advent of internal self-government and
the PAP victory. (OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430, "OCB Reports-SE Asia-3")

Printed from a carbon copy which bears this typed signature.

*Donald H. Anderson became Director
of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
on July 12, 1959.*

on Thursday, November 5, 1959

Top Secret Eyes Only

FRNS, M-S, 1958-60
Volume III

NSC
CIA

Present at the 423rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Acting Attorney General (Walsh) (Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 4); and Mr. Philip Ray for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; from the Atomic Energy Commission Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird, Edward J. Block and Bruce Mercer; Howard Furnas, Department of State; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

1. U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(NSC 5809; OCB Report on NSC 5809, dated August 12, 1959; NSC Action No. 2127; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 12 and 19, 1959; NIE 69-59)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☐ Deny
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☐ Reviewer WCF Date 2/2/83

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1/ Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, on Nov. 5, 1959.

2/ For the Malaya and Singapore sections of NSC 5809 see the portions of the National Security Council Report dated Apr. 2, 1958, on p. .

2/ In Action No. 2127 at the 418th meeting of the National Security Council on Sept. 10, 1959 (approved by the President on Sept. 14), the NSC discussed the Operations Coordinating Board Report of Aug. 12, 1959 and directed the NSC Planning Board to review U.S. policy on Singapore as defined in NSC 5809.

1/ In a memorandum for the NSC dated Oct. 12, 1959, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted a draft revision of NSC 5809 paragraphs 66-69 on Singapore together with a statement on "Financial Implications" and a "Background Paper on Singapore." (S/S NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5809 Series) The memorandum of Oct. 19 was not found either in Department of State files or in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.


1/ Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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7
A political secretary in the Singapore Finance Ministry.

8
Reference is to the Oct. 12, 1959 memorandum for the NSC by Lay.



2
Not found in either Department of State files or in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

3
Desp. 100 from Singapore on Sept. 10, 1959 presented an overview of the first three months of the Lee Kuan Yew government. ~~NSC (Not printed)~~

(746F.00/9-1059) An assessment of the period from Sept. 15 to Oct. 27, 1959 was contained in a memorandum from Richard K. Stuart, Chief of Southwest Pacific Division, Office of Research and Analysis for Asia, to Tanguy on Nov. 5, 1959. Stuart saw a continuity of "political authoritarianism, economic moderation and cultural puritanism" reflecting "the flexible and opportunistic posture of the PAP's ruling clique." In the section on political matters, Stuart contrasted the extension of a strong Public Security Ordinance, new controls on trade unions, and permission for the U.S.S. McCain to make two visits, with the release and appointment to office of several imprisoned left-wing party members and implicit government approval of visits to Communist China by leading Singapore citizens. (SPA Files, Lot 63 D 343, "Briefing Papers-Singapore")

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12/ Paragraph 68 provided that in the event that "Communists or extreme leftists" came to power in Singapore "by legal or violent means" the ^{United} ~~Free~~ States should consult with the ^{United Kingdom,} ~~USA,~~ Malaya and "other interested parties, and as necessary support counteraction, being prepared, as necessary, to take independent action along the lines of paragraph 20." Paragraph 69 stated that if "overt Communist aggression" should occur against Singapore, the U.S. should place initial reliance on the resources of Singapore, the ^{United Kingdom,} ~~USA,~~ and Malaya but should "be prepared to take action, if necessary, in accordance with paragraph 19." Paragraph 69B called on the ^{United States} ~~USA,~~ to encourage Singapore "to solve its political and economic problems in ways consistent with U.S. objectives" and to rely on the ^{United Kingdom} ~~USA,~~ for "external financial support to Singapore." In addition, in conjunction with the ^{(United Kingdom) (United States)} ~~USA,~~ the ~~USA,~~ should help to utilize "Free World international financial institutions" to promote "economic development and economic reforms in Singapore." Finally, the ^{United States} ~~USA,~~ should be prepared to grant technical and economic aid if such assistance would be particularly helpful in realizing the ends of U.S. policy. Paragraph 19 is summarized in footnote 8 to the extract from NSC 5809 dated Apr. 2, 1958 on p.

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13/ President of the French Republic.

Mr. Dulles then read a summary of the defense, foreign affairs and internal security powers of the U.K. in Singapore as described in Paragraph 1 of the "Background Paper on Singapore" attached to the draft policy paragraphs. The President said it was evident that the U.K. retained a strong position in Singapore.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of U.S. policy on Singapore, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2127-b as a revision of paragraphs 66-69 of NSC 5809, and the draft Annex to NSC 5809 (transmitted by the reference memoranda of October 12, 1959); in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (transmitted by the reference memoranda of October 19, 1959) and of NIE 69-59 ("Singapore--Problems and Prospects") as summarized orally at the meeting by the Director of Central Intelligence.
- b. Agreed that the draft Annex to the Singapore section of NSC 5809 (transmitted by the Limited Distribution memorandum of October 12, 1959) should not be adopted.

- c. Adopted the revised paragraphs 66, 67, 68, 69, 69A, 69B and 69C of NSC 5809
- d. Noted the President's statement that the United States should not be eager to take independent action with respect to Singapore, as contemplated in the revised paragraphs 67, 68, 69 and 69B of NSC 5809, in view of the continuing British responsibility in this area.

Paragraph 66 set the long range objective of encouraging "a politically stable, economically viable Singapore, willing to cooperate with the United States and capable of resisting internal and external Communist threats."

Paragraph 69A cautioned that the ^{United States} ~~USA~~ should not encourage a Singapore-Malaya merger unless and until such an outcome would further the goals of paragraphs 66 and 67. Meanwhile, the U.S. should use Singapore's desire for such a merger "to counteract the extreme left's pull on the government."

Paragraph 69C was a reminder that the ^{United States} ~~USA~~ should keep in mind the continuing ^{of the United Kingdom} ~~British~~ responsibility for Singapore's defense and foreign affairs; the ^{British} ~~USA~~ role in internal security, as well as the ^{British} ~~USA~~ knowledge and experiences in governing Singapore in order to avoid a course likely to

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of the Limited Distribution memorandum of October 12, 1959, with the request that each copy be returned for destruction.

The actions in c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5809.

[Here follows a section on "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

17/ A memorandum from Lay to the NSC on Nov. 10, 1959 reported that on that date the President had approved the adopted revisions of paragraphs 66-69 of NSC 5809 including the reservation expressed above. (S/S NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5809 Series)

15/ A memorandum from Mein to Parsons on Dec. 31, 1959 entitled "Current Situation in Singapore" (drafted by Tangguy, cleared by Arthur B. Emmons III, Deputy Director of SPA) concluded: "We share the British ~~xxx~~ view, by and large, that the new Singapore Government ~~has~~ so far turned out better than expected." To illustrate this conclusion, Mein pointed to the government's active response to "the threat posed by certain of the ex-detainees and other extreme leftists" including "the political sterilization of an extreme leftist cabinet minister, Ong Eng Guan" who had been "deprived of virtually all of his powers." Mein also was heartened by the government's program to reorient Singapore's Chinese away from an attachment to mainland China toward "Malayan consciousness and an allegiance to the State of Singapore." The memorandum also referred to official steps to reassure local business interests, to lure foreign investors and to reduce government spending in order to maintain a balanced budget. On the other hand, to date this economic record did not include a "large-scale program" to deal with an "increasingly serious unemployment and underemployment problem." A left-wing effort to "overturn the government" in 1960 was held unlikely but not impossible. Finally, Mein expressed concern over the government's "relaxation" of travel restrictions to Communist China which might affect the "Malayan consciousness" campaign and the anti-subversion program. (SPA Files, Lot 63 D 343, "Political Affairs-General")

SECRETEditorial Note

The revised Singapore section of NSC 5809, as approved by President Eisenhower on November 10, 1959, duplicated the initial draft revision, with the paragraphs labelled 69A, 69B and 69C later assigned separate numerical headings as paragraphs 70, 71, and 72. For the details of paragraphs 19 and 20, see footnote ¹² to Supra. The formal revised text is printed below:

" 66. Bearing in mind Singapore's strategic position and its importance to the Free World, encourage development toward a politically stable, economically viable Singapore, willing to cooperate with the United States and capable of resisting internal and external Communist threats.

" 67. Encourage and support British, Australian, Federation of Malaya and Singapore Government efforts to strengthen moderate political forces in order to counteract as much as possible the extreme left's pull on the Government. Be prepared, however, after consultation with the British, to take such independent action as necessary to accomplish this end.

" 68. In case the Communists or extreme leftists move to gain control of the Government by legal or violent means, consult with the United Kingdom, the Federation, and if appropriate other interested parties, support counteraction, being prepared, as necessary, to take independent action along the lines of paragraph 20.

" 69. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Singapore, place initial reliance on the resources possessed by Singapore, the British and the Federation of Malaya, but be prepared to take action, if necessary, in accordance with paragraph 19.

" 70. While recognizing the desire of Singapore to merge with the Federation, do not encourage such a step unless and until such action appears to be useful in achieving both long-range and short-range U. S. aims as set forth in paragraphs 66 and 67; in the meantime use the Singapore Government's desire for closer ties and eventual merger with the Federation in an effort to counteract the extreme left's pull on the government.

" 71. Encourage efforts by the Government of Singapore to solve its political and economic problems in ways consistent with U. S. objectives. To the extent feasible, rely on the United Kingdom to provide external financial support to Singapore and, to the extent desired by the United Kingdom, support the utilization of Free World international financial institutions in the promotion of economic development and economic reforms in Singapore. Be prepared, however, to provide U. S. technical and economic development assistance when such assistance would be of special significance in achieving U. S. objectives.

" 72. In all U. S. activities in Singapore, keep in mind the continuing British responsibility for Singapore's defense and foreign affairs, and the British role in internal security as well as British knowledge and experiences in governing Singapore, and seek to avoid action likely to cause a serious misunderstanding between the United States and the United Kingdom."

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711.56396/9-258

Telegram from the Ambassador in the Philippines (Bohlen) to the
Department of State

Secret

Manila, September 2, 1958--4 p.m.

789.

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT.

REDEPTTEL 621 SENT TOKYO 332.

1. A) RE PARA 1 REFTTEL, IT IS OUR FEELING THAT IN ANY BASE DISCUSSIONS WITH PHILS WE WILL BE FACING SERIOUS HANDICAP IF WE UNABLE REVEAL EXISTENCE OF SECRET JAPANESE MINUTE. AS DEPT AWARE, PHILS VERY SENSITIVE TO TREATMENT WE GIVE JAPANESE AND DURING BENDETSEN NEGOTIATIONS AND FOLLOWING PHILS MADE CONSTANT REFERENCE TO FACT WE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM SAME JURISDICTION ARRANGEMENT WE HAVE WITH "EX-ENEMY JAPAN".

C) OUR IDEA ON DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM IS THAT AT APPROPRIATE TIME DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SERRANO WE INFORM HIM OF ITS EXISTENCE DEMONSTRATING ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITH AVAILABLE PUBLIC STATISTICS ON WAIVERS BY THE JAPANESE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE TEXT OF THE JAPANESE MINUTE SHOULD BE SHOWN TO SERRANO OR THAT WE SHOULD MAKE ANY SPECIFIC EXPLANATION OF HOW IT WORKS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT INFORMING PHILS OF JAPANESE SECRET MINUTE WOULD IN ANY WAY CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE ON WAIVER PROBLEM BUT WOULD AT LEAST REMOVE POINT WHICH HAS HAD CONTINUING DELETIOUS EFFECT ON DISCUSSIONS JURISDICTION.

D) WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR TOKYO TO CONSULT JAPANESE OR FOR SECRETARY TO DISCUSS WITH FUJIYAMA DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND SECURE JAPANESE AGREEMENT TO PERMIT US DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS TO INFORM PHILS OF THE EXISTENCE OF SECRET MINUTE ON WAIVERS.

2. A) RE PARA 2 REFTTEL, WE FULLY EXPECT THESE TWO QUESTIONS TO BE BROUGHT UP BY THE PHILS DURING THE FORTHCOMING EXPLORATORY TALKS ON BASES. THE QUESTION OF USE OF BASES IN PHILS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS NOT INVOLVING PHILS AROSE DURING BENDETSEN TALKS. IN PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED DURING RECTO MISSILE BASE CONTROVERSY (ENCL 3 TO EMBDESP 65), SERRANO MADE REFERENCE TO THE STOCKPILING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PHILS AND THAT ANY ACTION WOULD BE POLICY DECISION ON PART OF "BOTH GOVTS".

B) ANY MODIFICATION IN PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS WITH JAPANESE WOULD BE USED BY PHILS TO JUSTIFY AND SUPPORT CHANGES THEY DESIRE IN US-PHIL RELATIONS. IN VIEW PRESS COVERAGE BEING GIVEN LOCALLY TO DESIRES OF JAPANESE TO EFFECT CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT, WE CAN EXPECT PHILS TO BE ALERT TO ANY CHANGES OR SUGGESTED CHANGES BY JAPANESE AND TO SEEK EQUAL IF NOT BETTER TREATMENT FROM THE US.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☐ Releasable
☒ Releasable if C.I.D. concurs
☒ Excise as shown
☐ Deny
☐ Downgrade to
☐ Review Again
☐ Reviewer
 Date 7/27/83

BOHLEN